Etica invisibile

People are dying so that you can read this blog.

Your internet access fees could
more than double the income of a $400-a-year Ghanaian laborer. People are starving to death, and there you sit, with resources enough to save them (and with reputable charities standing by to effect the transfers), padding your own already luxuriant lifestyle. That’s a choice you made. It’s a choice almost everyone in the First World makes. It might or might not be a horrific choice, but it’s one for which we easily forgive each other.

(Do you already give money to Ghanaian laborers? I applaud you and I wish others would do the same. But it doesn’t change the fact that other Ghanaian laborers are dying so you can have your Internet.)

Someday you might find yourself strolling through a desert with a bottle of water and stumble on a man dying of thirst. I bet you’ll offer him some water, and I bet you’d think much less of anyone who didn’t. But there is, as far as I can see, no important moral difference between surfing the web while Africans starve and strolling through the desert while men die in front of you.


I said there’s no moral difference, which is not the same as saying there’s no difference at all. We evolved to be callous towards those who are distant (or invisible) and kind toward those who are close. (Robin Hanson posts frequently and insightfully on the contrast between how we treat the near and the far.) It’s pretty clear why there might be an evolutionary advantage to behaving that way. If you’ve got a reputation for helping your friends and ignoring strangers, then more people will want to be your friends. So it pays to favor the close and the visible. Our emotions are wired that way, and there’s probably not much we can do to change it. Attempts to change human nature do not have a good historical success rate.

Steve Landsburg

Cosa trarne?

Forse chi vede una distanza abissale tra Etica ed Economia dovrebbe riflettere.

Gran parte dei comportamenti che crediamo eticamente fondati sono invece il frutto di scelte economiche.

Altro esempio:

Imagine a miner trapped in a mine. It will cost thirty million dollars to get him out. With that thirty million, we could build a guardrail that will save three lives. We’ve seen the miner’s face on the news; we’ve seen his family; we know his name. All of our instincts — the same instincts that let us ignore those Ghanaian laborers — tell us to save the man we know and ignore the three we don’t know. Those, I think, are bad instincts. Anyone with amnesia — anyone, that is, who is forced to take an unbiased view of the situation — would want us to save three lives rather than one. (Because each of us, in a state of amnesia, has triple the chance of being saved by a guard rail.) It’s no use saying we should both build the guardrail and save the miner; that only raises the question of whether we ought to build two guardrails instead of one.

Obiezioni?

La morale si compra al mercato un tanto al chilo

Lo scambio implica fiducia e la fiducia implica scambi.

Ovvero, l' economia implica l' etica e l' etica favorisce l' economia.

Ovvero, tutto puo' essere ridotto ad economia.

Ovvero, il mercato non ha bisogno di regole.

Ovvero:

The psychologist Joseph Henrich... and his colleagues engaged over 2,000 people in 15 small communities around the world in a two-player exchange called the “ultimatum game,” in which one subject is given a sum of money equivalent to a day’s pay and is allowed to keep or share some or all of it with another person. Let’s say I give you $100 to split between yourself and your partner in the game. Whatever division of the money you propose, if your partner accepts it, you are both richer by that amount, but if he rejects it, neither of you receives any money.

How much would you offer? Why not suggest a $90-$10 split, as classical economics predicts, thus maximizing your personal profit? The other player wouldn't turn down a free ten bucks, would he? As it turns out, he would very often. In Henrich's research, proposals that deviated much beyond a $70-$30 split were usually rejected. But not always. There was variation between groups and societies. Henrich and his team found that people in hunter-gatherer communities shared about 25 percent of the pot, while people in societies who regularly engage in trade gave away about 45 percent. What they called "market integration" was by far the strongest predictor of fairness and generosity.

Henrich concluded that norms of market fairness “evolved as part of an overall process of societal evolution to sustain mutually beneficial exchanges in contexts where established social relationships (for example, kin, reciprocity, and status) were insufficient.” In other words, we are naturally inclined to be fair and generous with our kin and kind because of genetic relatedness and reciprocal connectedness. But to get people to be fair and generous to strangers in other tribes, we need cultural institutions, especially trade.